In a
disappointing ruling, a federal judge in Bridgeport,
Conn. deferred to the
government's interpretation of the rule that
conditions Medicare coverage for SNF care on
spending at least three prior calendar days in the
hospital. The statute says that the individual
must have been an "inpatient" for those three days,
but the government has interpreted
that to mean that the three days must have been in
formal admission status. As a consequence,
beneficiaries who spend part of the three days in
the ER or on outpatient status are not considered to
have been inpatient for three days and are not
eligible for the follow-up SNF coverage. Since
patients are often formally admitted from the ER or
outpatient status in the middle of the night
- and could as easily have been admitted
prior to midnight if an admitting doctor or hospital
bed had been available -
the effect of the rule is to deprive people who
should have been eligible
of
their SNF coverage.
The
Court's lengthy decision (see 2006 WL 2560297 (D.Conn.
2006)) essentially concludes that the government's
interpretation is entitled to sufficient deference
that the court should not disturb it. Since
the case had already been certified as a nationwide
class, the decision on the merits is applicable
throughout the country. On
plaintiffs' appeal, amicus briefs supporting
the plaintiffs were filed by consumer groups led by
AARP, and providers led by the American Health Care
Association.
On October 1, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court. --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 4426572
(2d Cir. 2008). Judge Livingston, writing for
herself and Judge Hall (with the third judge having
recused himself), determined that (1) the statute
was ambiguous; (2) the policy was not entitled to
"Chevron deference" because it was published in a
manual rather than through notice-and-comment
rulemaking; (3) under the less demanding "Skidmore
test" the policy was sufficiently persuasive for the
Court to defer, and it would therefore uphold the
policy; and (4) the Court's prior decisions did not
lead to a different result. The Court also rejected
the plaintiffs' equal protection argument on the
ground that defining "inpatient" to be based on
formal admission was administratively convenient and
therefore rational. Finally, the Court held that the
district court had not abused its discretion in
striking evidence introduced by the plaintiffs
outside the administrative record.
Counsel for the plaintiffs have not decided what
further steps, if any, to take.
For
information on the case or issue, contact Gill
Deford (gdeford @ medicareadvocacy.org)
or Toby Edelman (tedelman @ medicareadvocacy.org)
in the Center's Connecticut or Washington offices,
respectively.